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ONE of the difficulties, in the way of an intelligent reading of
psycho-analvtic hypotheses, is that the reader does not co-
ordinate that which is being- read with the various presuppositions
which, in some form and with some considerable degree of conscious-
ness, of clarity and of consistency, are sure to be held by the psycho-
analytic author. These presuppositions and their experiencial back-
ground, are the subjective context, without an approximate duplica-
tion of which the words that are used cannot be properly interpreted.
Without such contextual coordination, it is impossible to read psycho-
analytic literature empathically. Without its empathic reading,^
psycho-analytic literature is not being understood. Therefore it seems
to be important that there should be published some formulation of
these ])resuppositions. Here I limit myself to making, a brief for-
mulation of one of these, namely: a psycho-analysts attitude toward
the hypothesis of a complete and rigid psychologic determinism.
Those who attach any affect-value and its moralistic rationalization,
to the free-will dogma, cannot be expected to adequately coordinate
a deterministic theory with their reading, even if they intellectually
grasp that theory as an abstraction.
In one sense there is nothing wholly new in the attitude which I
will formulate. And yet this attitude will not be adequately em-
pathized, unless it is also coordinated with an organismic view of
man as such, and as in organic unity with the whole of the universe.
This organismic view carries with it the hypothesis of an omtogenetic
recapitulation of the psychologic evolution of the race. It is also
necessary to coordinate my statement with other related modem
^"Psycho-analvh'c method of observation," International Journal of Psycho-
anahsis. Vol.6, (No. 2) pp. 155-170. 1925.
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concepts of some philosophers.' Such ideas are a part of the sub-
jective context of my formulation. The only novelty to be found
herein, is that some of these attitudes are here formulated with spec-
ial reference to the psycho-analyst's use of the deterministic
approach to psycho-genetic problems. Usually the word "deter-
minants" is referred only to the objective physical aspect of the sum
total of our psychologic determinants. Psycho-analysts emphasize
the subjective contribution to the sum total of our psychologic deter-
minants, as these were developed in the course of our racial and
personal psychologic past. Again, this description will differ from
some other descriptions in that for logical argument I will substitute
deterministic explanations. I am not arguing in support of a deter-
ministic concept of psychology. I am merely describing one such
concept in mechanistic and psycho-analytic terms.
Origin of "Free-will" Concept
As our unconscious automatic impulses evolve to conscious de-
sires, the foundation is being laid for the conflict of theory as be-
tween explanations that involve respectively freedom of the will and
psychologic determinism. We knowingly distinguish anything only
by contrast with its opposite. Either the free-will or the determin-
istic hypothesis could come to a conscious expression, only in con-
trast with a more or less latent, and perhaps a less conscious and a
less imperative urge, toward the contrary hypothesis. A more or less
tem])orary accretion, of more or less of unconsciously determined
preponderance of affect value, will force one or the other of the con-
flicting urges to find conscious expression and rationalization.
In these earlier stages of development, man is still unaware of his
dependence upon nature's processes as a whole. With such very
large ignorance, he would be compelled to unconsciously abstract
from the rest of the universe, the first seeming causal relationship
between his desires, his conscious planning and the later approxi-
mate realization of his preconceived ends. By ignoring all the rest
of the universe, and remaining unconscious of the present influence
of even his own psychologic past, man must see his few abstractions
as if being in the relationship of cause and effect. Again because of
^Here I have in mind hvpotheses someiihat like the following: Vaihingor
H. The Philosophy of As If, 1924 (translated from the 6th German Edition
Also: G. K. Ogder. and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning; Alfred
Latka, Elements of Physical Biology.
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ignorance, and the subjective dissociation of interest and the result-
ant abstraction, many are impelled to formulate their experience as
if their own "uncaused" desire and "uncaused" planning had been
the sole cause of the seeming effect.
Thus the concept of a "free-will," as being the chief or only de-
terminant for some few subsequent objective events, had its natural
understandable origin, in the psychologic imperatives of our igno-
rance, and immaturity. In time there came an enlargement of the
human contemplation of nature, far beyond that which could be
thought of as bearing any possible relation as an effect from the self-
determined, relatively omnipotent "free-will" of the human animal.
In order to explain the behavior of such more remote parts of the
environment as were obviously beyond human control, man made an
animistic projection. By thus projecting into objective nature, a
delusionally magnified and exalted "designing" self, with the limited
potency of his Inmian free-will universalized, man created his ab-
solutely free-willed, omnipotent, designing Gods.^
The occasional man's obsession with unconventional human l)e-
havior found its earlier explanation in harmony with the projected
ideas of theology. Accordingly eccentric compulsions would induce
an explanation, in terms of either demonic possession or spiritual
regeneration. Again there was conflict, as to whether or not' either
of such conditions were in some sense the product of an unconditioned
human choice, or were they predetermined by some super-human
power, for weal or woe. The peculiarl}^ personal need of self-exalta-
tion, or for an excuse for delinquency, sometimes determmed the
choice of theory. Out of such subjective conflicts came the elabora-
tion of theories of predestination, fore-ordination, fatalism, demonic
possession, oneness with God, determinism and freedom of the will,
each with many variations of details, conditions and subjective con-
text.
When the unknown determinants of our psychologic imperatives
expressed themselves in conventionally approved form, there was
little temptation to think of, or look for any but flattering super-
human controls, such as an intimate guidance by or unity with the
divine, all accepted as being achieved through a self-glorifying free
choice of the personal "free-will". The contrast between the ob-
viously very different behavior of those alleged to be "demonically
possessed", and the "spiritually regenerated," and just 'average
^Fauerbach, Ludwig., Essence of Christianity.
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healthy minded persons, found a comforting, self-glorifying explana-
tion for the super-righteous ones, in the doctrine of divinely
approved conduct, initiated and achieved by their own unaided, in-
herent morally superior freedom of will. These self-righteousness
ones, working under the illusion of being spiritually reborn, with
a close approximation to divine perfection, had need for a free-will
theory of explanation, probably because of some discredited past.
Without some free-will theory the delusionally achieved exaltation
would lose its glory, and its power to neutralize a guilty feeling of
inadequacy. A feeling of inadequacy, or of inferiority, could get no
compensatory or neutralizing, glorified exaltation from a naturalistic,
rigidlv determined state, such as is contracted with and delusionally
characterized as "spiritual perfection". Because of this, the feeling
of inadequacy quite inevitably expresses itself in emotionally deter-
mined resistance to a deterministic hypothesis. All such deluded,
even though unconscious pietists, must have a "free-will", since
without that none of the much needed comforting delusion of moral
superiority could be maintained. Likewise they must project a
"free-will" choice into those other unconventional persons, who are
accused of being the children or emissaries of the devil. It would
minimize the relative value of the moralistic self-glorification of the
"spiritually reborn," if the others had not out of their own inherent
wickedness, deliberately and freely rejected "the only true god."
Toward the Deterministic Hypothesis
Seme persons fail to achieve conventional delusions of gran-
deur, adequate for neutralizing their feeling of guilt. However, these
persons still need some superhuman excuse, which will so explain
their condition and conduct as to minimize the self-reproaches. Under
this impulse some who were accused of witchcraft actually admitted
a Satanic control. Others, less abnormal perhaps, can be content with
a more naturalistic excuse. These will be predisposed to emotion-
ally accept a theory that their "deplorable" compulsions are deter-
mined by the immediate environmental factor, or by hereditv In
modern times, insanity may be added among the permissable de-
terminants of disapproved behavior. Out of such need and such
material many come to be obsessed by emotionally determined one
hundred percent absolutetistic concept of psychologic determinism.
Ihis however must be distinguished from the more objective, and
inductively derived and more tentatively held concept of psychologic
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determinism.
In recent times there has come to consciousness, from an ever
widening range in time and space, increasing data of regularly re-
curring sequences, all suggestive of ever widening range in the uni-
formity of "'law" in causal relationships. With the increasing use of
tools, and the quite-conscious human manipulation (by conscious re-
conditioning) of nature's forces, there has also come the larger un-
derstanding of the potency of natural conditions, as detemiining in-
fluences in nature's yield to human comfort. The more conscious
investigations of scientists, over an ever widening field in time and
space, tends to promote the generalization of the observed repetitions
in sequence as if existing in all of the unknown as well as known
parts of nature. At least within the known parts of the material
aspects of the uiverse, this induced the mental constructs of "natural
law," and "cause and effect." This modern, more scientific concept
of determinism is being ever more objectively conditioned.
With a growing consciousness of the limitations of our thinking
faculties, a new element became coordinated with this previously lim-
ited concept of causation, under natural law. After some develop-
ment of these concepts, some humans became aware that the natural
limitations of our thinking faculties are such that we can no longer
imagine any limitations beyond which "causation" and "natural law"
are not supreme. So came a new formulation and valuation of the
deterministic hypotheses as a conscious intellectual construct, rather
than an unconsciously generalized projection.
By means of such verbal symbols as the word "infinite," we en-
large our concepts into elaborate philosophic (and theologic?) spec-
ulations without knowing anything about, or being able to conceive,
that which is supposedly being represented by the verbal symbols
which we are using.
This practice was at first limited to the whole of the material
aspects of the universe. But, because we cannot conceive of spacial
or temporal limitlessness of "causation" any more than the limited-
ness thereof, we simply substitute a fictive mental (logical?) con-
struct and its verbal symbolization, in lieu of any actual concept of
universal infinite determinism.
This fictive assumption, of a rigid and universal determinism,
is logically (not experiencially or conceptually) warranted by the
fact that, given a certain temperament and a considerabe amoimt of
scientific training some of us can no longer postulate a time or place
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beyond which the "Natural Law" and "causation" do not work. This
limitation of our thinking faculties compels us to logically construct a
formula of universal "causation," and of "universal natural law."
All psychologic investigation not only presupposes but confirms the
undemonstratable hypothesis of such a complete and absolutely rigid
determinism. The "cause of causation" we ignore, together with all
other alleged experiencial ultiraates and absolutes, as being something
beyond the limited capacity of humans. So long as any thought of
universal "causation" is recognized as being a pure construction of
our mind, made necessary by the minds own limitations, the quest for
an ultimate cause of such fictive absolute "causation" begins to look
silly.
However, some of us find ourselves in a stage of development
which is such that we must abide bv, and act in harmony with such
a deterministic presupposition, even about psychology, and in spite of
the fact that an absolute determinism can never be proven to be ab-
soluely true.
Now the dynamics behind our logical necessity compelled, in
many persons, a reconstruction of the older "absolutely true" con-
cept, concerning the theologic and demonic determinants of thought
and conduct. The revision has brought many of us to the generalized
hypothesis of an undesigned, undesigning, natural, mechanistic, rigid-
ly determined, unconscious universe. However, the divided interests
of most psychologic personalities still compells an adherence to the
dissociation of the physical universe and the human psyche. Thus
many are compelled to project and rationalize their internal conflict
of impulse by affirming both the freedom of the human will and the
complete determinism in all non-psychologic relations.
Concerning Evolution in Intellectual Methods
H however, the psyche is quite thoroughly unified, and if with
this is integrated the more inclusive view of natural causation, coupled
with, or perhaps inducing an organismic view of man in an organic
unity with the whole of the universe, there will result a more rigorous
and all inclusive generalization of the deterministic hypothesis. Thus,
sooner or later, will come the organismic view of the whole of man,
in an indissoluble organic unity with the whole of a rigidly determined
universe. Now, for such persons, a rigorously determined, logical
necessity, will impel toward the inclusion of the human psyche, as a
mere unimportant aspect of a small part of the force-aspect a rigidly
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determined universe. So comes a more mature and a more tenta-
tively held hypothesis of universal, rigidly determined, psychologic
imperatives, which now takes the place of the older notions of fatal-
ism, predestination, fore-ordination, demonic possession, identifi-
cation with God, etc., etc. Likewise, at this stage of development,
of a thoroughly unified personality, the old moral valuations and
judgments approximate to being wholly outgrown. In their stead
we make a more objective classification of thought and conduct, ac-
cording to an evolutionary concept of psychologic maturing, in our
intellectual methods.
I believe such objective standards exist, for roughly measuring
several degrees of relative approaches to an unascertainable abso-
lute truth of one's convictions. In general I would say that this
should be decided by the relative maturity of our intellectual methods.
But this again resolves itself into a number of different factors.
Am.ong these we may name: (1) the relative maturity of our im-
pulses, both before and after becoming conscious as desires ; (2) the
relative maturity of the mental mechanism by which our impulses
make themselves effective in thought and action ; (3) the relative
degrees to which we are conscious of the determinants (especially the
usually unconscious and other subjective determinants coming from
out of our psychologic past) for the precise quality of our mpulses
or desires; (4) the relative quantity, variety, and complexity of ex-
periencial and cultural material and scientific data available, and
which is actually and consciously coordinated into any particular
judgment; (5) the relative degrees of thoroughness with which the
available data are all coordinated into a single judgment ; (6) the
manner of their use, as to whether or not they are selectively grouped
so as to rationalize and confirm, or to check and correct our probably,
subconsciously determined and less mature predispositions; (7) the
relative degrees of thoroughness to which we are conscious of all
these processes, especially as they eventuate in the rationalizations
of the determining and usually unconscious impulses, in combination
with the usually more conscious desires.
Determinism Indispensip.le to Psycjiofogists
Any scientific investigation, of nature's processes, can have mean-
ing or value, only on the more or less conscious assumption of approx-
imate uniformity in the behavior of nature's force aspect, so long as
the conditions remain substantially the same. All scientific research
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has among^ its main obiects, the discovery of even more of the in-
numerable conditioning^ factors of changfe. in the manifestations of
nature's habitual behaviour-processes. All this is but aother way of
sayins^ that all physical scientists work upon the more or less con-
scious assumption of a rigid and universal determinism. The psycho-
analyst believes that all scientists in the field of psychology^ must
do the same, if their investigations are to have any meaning. This
deterministic hypothesis has been measurably confirmed by all
psychological observation.
As I see psvcho-analytic investigation, it is an attempt to more
rigorously apply this scientific spirit and approach to problems of
psycho-genetics, mental mechanisms, psvchologic evolution, and men-
tal hygiene. This means that, as in all the rest of nature, we must
even though it Avill ever remain undemonstrable, act as if presuppos-
ing the human psyche, to be operating according to some discover-
able "laws" and discoverable conditioning factors of its own, quite
bevond or dififerent from the more known bio-chemical factors. In
other words, the psychanalyst's fundamental hypothesis must be de-
terministic, and not moralistic, if his research is to have meaning or
value for him. In so far this scientific spirit dominates our psvcho-
logic research, it will help humanity to outgrow its emotional con-
flicts, and so to outgrow the resultant moralistic values and dogmas.
In so far as moralistic presuppositions influence our research, even
though the moral values and the effect both remain unconscious, our
research-work will be relatively unreliable. Like the other scientists,
psychanalysts are coming to investigate the actual subjective aspect
of the psychologic processes of human nature, as distinguished from
its symptomatic objectivization or its abstracted social products.
Accordingly they are quite heedless of what will be the efi^ect of their
researches upon their own or other people's preconceptions and valu-
ations, either teliologic. theologic or moralistic. Instead of being
dominated by the hysterical fears, or the subjectivelv determined val-
uation of moral dogmas, labelled conscience, we study its genesis
and growth, through all its varied manifestations, with the hope of
outgrowing every factor of a subjectively and unconsciously deter-
mined conscience.
Inconsistency of Theory and Conduct
Those who were dominated by an unconsciously determined need
for a "free-will" easily found abundant material for a special plea in
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justification of their unconsciously pre-determined conclusion. Some
were induced to make the larger coordinations, into a more inclusive
concept of cause and effect. Even now avowed determinists very
often fail to act consistently with our deterministic hypothesis. When
this inconsistency becomes obvious or somehow conscious, we are
sure that even that inconsistency can be explained on a psycho-
genetic and deterministic basis. On the surface, it seems to imply
that the inconsistency manifests two aspects of a divided interest
("double personality"). In searching for the determining causes of
our inconsistency, we naturally expect to find two factors ; the one
environmental, and the other subjective.
The most obvious ignoring of the deterministic hypothesis is to
be found in our relative quiesence in the presence of punishment for
"criminals". The great crowd is too ignorant, too impatient, too
much the victim of irreconcilable impulses (especially unconscious
sado-masochism) within its individual members, to deal intelligently
with "delinquents". As a vent to its own suppressed anti-social and
sadistic impulses, the crowd must enact legalized and moralized hate
toward the offender. To justify punishment it must also rationalize
its underlying unconscious (perhaps sadistic) impulses by the other
fellows "free-will" and "moral duty." Accordingly those who have
the conscious attitude of a deterministic psychologist, and can
approximately live it, as yet find themselves in such a hopeless minor-
ity, that for a long time to come it will be useless to insist that our
jails be converted into hospital-schools. Here the environment com-
pels the small minority of scientific determinists to act inconsistent
with their deterministic hypothesis. In this we see the environmental
contribution to the determinants of such inconsistency.
But a differently troublesome situation arises when those who
profess adherence to a deterministic hypothesis are so often impelled
even quite unconsciously impelled, toward the expression of moral
values, and moral judgments, which are in many ways inconsistent
with their professed determinism. Often this inconsistency is quite
obviously the product of a subjective conflict of impulses. Those
who are still the victims of a "divided personality," may at times find
it convenient to excuse their own mal-adjustment in terms of deter-
minism. Not having outgrown the subjective moral conflict and its
affect-values, and yet being compelled to violate their own morbid
conscience, such persons often find solace and defense in the zealous
advocacy of an excusing deterministic hypothesis. But preci^^ely be-
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cause it is a mere rationalization of one amon.^ divided interests, such
determinists cannot limit their more overt acts even to an approxi-
mate harmony with it. Sometimes this conflict is unconsciously re-
vealed by a subconsciously determined g-esture, a moralistic vocabu-
lary, or bv intonations of the voice which imply moral values and
jud.c^ments. So then, although perhaps at times vociferously pro-
claiming- a psychologic determinism, yet in their social activities, such
persons will quite as persistently act upon the hypothesis of freedom
of will, and its accompanying moral iudgments.*
Only those who have reached a high degree of psychologic (as
distinguished from social) sublimation, and its high maturity of intel-
lectual methods, have approximately outgrown the subjective con-
flict. Only such can act in conscious, comfortable approximate har-
mony with a clear vision of the organic and mechanistic unity of man
and his universe. These few have almost accomplished within them-
selves the transference of the whole of their libido to the psycho-evo-
lutionary process and to its implied deterministic hypothesis. Those
who can thus harmonize their interest and their conduct, let us say to
the extent of 90% thereof, on the deterministic, psycho-evolutionary
hypothesis, will seldom betray, even by unconsciously determined ges-
ture, vocabulary, or intonations of voice, any evidence of even the
unconscious influences of a moral values or judgments.
The advocates of a free-will hypothesis also find themselves un-
able to live in complete harmony with that theory. If the human will
is wholly free, in the sense of being wholly dissociated from any
psychologic chain of "cause and efifect," then in human relations
nothing would be predictable, everything would be chaos. xA.nd yet,
even free-willites must act as if psychologic functioning was a matter
of "cause and efifect" and human impulses could be consciously and
effectively reconditioned. To some persons our human relations
and institutions really seem chaotic, or insane. Under a complete
freedom of the will, training, discipline, education would all be use-
less. Even criminal puishment ceases to have any sense in it, if the
human will or desire is wholly immune from disciplinary influence,
which is deterministic. So one may prolong indefinitely a useless
logical discussion.
*See : Jennin.^s, Prof. H. S. in Jourval of Philosophy, Psychology & Scien-
tific Method, 16:180-3; Mch. 17, 1919; and mv comment in "Determinism Con-
duct and Fear PsvcholoRv." Psychoanalytic Rcviezv 6 (No. 4) : 379-390; Oct.
1919, Reviewed in: Psyche & Eros 1 (No. 2) 126; Sept.-Oct. 1920.
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The determinist's objection to the punishment of crime is based on
the view that iiidicial punishment takes no intelligent account of psy-
chologic determinism, nor of any causation for the anti-social be-
havior, except extreme insanity. Therefore our whole system of
criminology is a most crassly ignorant method of reconditioning the
anti-social impulses. Accordingly it is inadequate and often pro-
motes the very conduct which it pretends to improve, if not cure.
Out of the impossibility for either free-willites or determinists
to live zvJioIly consistent with their respective theories, has come a
sort of compromise. Some (conventional) conduct is self-determined
and other (unconventional) conduct is not. In every such judgment
I am sure a genetic psychologist would have little trouble in finding
the compromise to be conditioned, by the unconscious experiencial
factor, which determine the fear-psychology, or by the need for
rationalizing a subjective conflict of impulse.
Our psyche is so unconsciously fluid and so variously multi-
fariously and complexly conditioned, as not to leave conduct easily
predictable, except in cases of morbid compulsions which are lim-
ited to a relative few simple and obsessing reaction-patterns, which
are marked deviations from the conventional normal. Accordingly
all those who must have moral value, and have any affective need for
a free-will hypothesis, can find much to confirm their predisposition.
Likewise those who concentrate their attention sufficiently upon un-
usual psychologic compulsions can find equally cogent evidence for a
universal psychologic determinism. If either of these feel the need
of making logical special pleas in support of their tempermental need,
we are quite certain that they are still the victims of a subjective
conflict, and have not yet arrived at the calm acceptance of mature
intellectual methods.
The chaos, of a complete absense of deterministic control, would
mean a condition in which freedom of action for the attainment of
preconceived ends would be impossible. Under complete psychologic
determinism, if accompanied by a very large understanding of it,
there can be achieved a maximum of freedom from the more painful
social maladjustments.
In Conclusion
In the material sciences this change, from free-will-moralistic
concept to a deterministic one, was achieved only when we had com-
pletely abandoned all metaphysical preconceptions, all teliologic
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interpretations, and all moralistic valuations of every part or theory
of the physical universe. Now the material scientists, as such, concern
themselves not at all with such matters. In all branches of research
involving the material aspects of the universe, scientists concern
themselves quite excliisively with the study of nature's processes.
Thev wish to know hozv things behave and of the determining con-
ditions of their varied behavioristic manifestations. So the material
scientists tend to ignore all the former moralistic preconceptions and
valuations, for those parts of nature's processes which were formerly
viewed and rated morally because of their being deemed of personal,
social or religious importance. In the physicist's laboratory method
conscience has been wholly dethroned or outgrown. Also, scientists
have come to ignore divine design and teliology. They are always
ambitious to learn how more consciously to rearrange (recondition)
parts of the cosmic stuff, for greater certainty of human welfare
—
that is for the better human adjustments to the physical environment.
That is only another way of saying that the best of scientists are
concerned only with understanding nature's processes. Such con-
spicuous exceptions as Sir Oliver Lodge, are so rare as to suggest a
morbidly determined compulsion behind their pronounced spiritistic
predisposition. In the domain of psychologic research, those who
aspire to the rank of scientists must show their capacity to pursue the
scientific method, free from interference by emotion and conscience.
When seemingly undetermined experiences or psychologic events
come to us, all of our very limited understanding impels us, as under
like conditions it impels the physicist, to search for new, and hitherto
undiscovered natural determinants rather than to assume uncondi-
tined, undetermined psychologic occurrences, or a supernatural caus-
ation. All scientists do this, although probably most of them under-
stand quite well that the concept of a hypothetical universal deter-
minism under "natural law", (especially as that may be applied to the
psyche) is largely, perhaps wholly, a Active construction of the hu-
man intellect. A\^e realize that other persons have their psychologic
imperatives differently conditioned than we do, and that therefore
they will be differently predisposed toward a new problem. We re-
mind such that they will have special difficulty in reading psycho-
analytic literature empathically. Psychanalysts go so far as to try to
discover and explain all of these differences, even in the psychologic
imperative and the resultant difference in psychologic theory, in
terms of a different psychologic preparedness (predisposition), to
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be once more explained by the varying antecedent experiencial factors
that conditioned our separate and different development, during our
respective psychologic pasts. Thus we sooer or later arrive at a
place where such differences of presupposition are seen in relation to
the quality of the underlying impulses, and their resultant, or asso-
ciated mental mechanisms, and all this classified according to a psy-
cho-evolutionary concept. However tentatively the deterministic
hypothesis is held, we treat it as the best working fiction that our ex-
perience permits and our psychologic imperatives compel us to con-
struct, and therefore we hope to be able to work in close and quite
rigid harmony with it. We succeed to the same degree that our
emotional trends are united, and our other limitations permit.
Neither are we temperamentally predisposed to find in this hypo-
thetical rigid and universal psychologic determinism, any explanatory
justification for a despondency which often accompanies fatalism.
Water is still composed of oxygen and hydrogen, but in the special
form of combination known as water, it has new properties and ex-
erts a new and different influence upon many substances, with which
it may come in contact. So, in mind, illuminated by the larger and
more penetrating psycho-analytic understanding of psychologic be-
havior has, by the very fact, a larger capacity for measurably and con-
sciously reconditioning the human energy (the desires and mental
mechanisms) of some other persons. Also some of us are thereby be-
ing impelled to discipline ourselves, so as to develop different auto-
matic reaction toward the human stimulii of the environment, and
thereby insure more comfortable social adjustment.
In such efforts we will be efficient, just to the degree of perfection
to which we are able to live consistently with our deterministic hy-
pothesis. In this new and increasingly efficient compulsion to man-
ipulate the human psyche, we find an abundant compensation for
relinquishing the delusional joys of our former free-will hypothesis.
